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NEW LOGAN-WALTER BILL
The history of the struggle of the Logan-Walter
bill, intended to govern by law federal officers and
agencies, is told in the March and April, 1941, numbers of the A.B.A. Journal. The House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association at its meeting on
March 17th, 1941, adopted a statement of principles,
and expressed the opinion that Senate Bill 674, introduced by Senator Hatch, best embodied such principles. Since then, Congressman Walter has introduced H. R. 4238 in the House, which is almost the
identical bill.
Hearings have commenced in the Senate and will
probably continue for a month or six weeks. Numerous federal agencies are attacking the bill and they
are, for the most part, insisting that their agencies be
exempt therefrom. No one expects them to agree to
any legislation which will in any considerable measure
affect their powers and jurisdiction.
We must depend upon the lawyers in the respective
states organizing and conducting such a campaign of
education with the State Medical Associations, State
American Legions, farm groups, patriotic groups and
others, to support the Senators and Congressmen from
the respective states in their fight for this legislation.
The American people, of all classes and professions,
made a magnificent fight in behalf of the LoganWalter bill and we can make an even better one
(Continued on Next Page)
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in behalf of the two bills I have mentioned, if the various state
organizations and groups will inform themselves with respect
thereto, and lend their active and vigorous assistance. The
people and not the politicians will save this country from totalitarianism if it can be saved.
I therefore urge that every lawyer write our Senators and
Congressmen asking them to support this worthy legislation and
that you interest others to do the same.
H. G. NILLES,
President.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS
Washington, D. C.-Impetus to the work of the National Conference of Judicial Councils was given at a luncheon here, held
in connection with the meeting of the American Law Institute, at
which members of the conference heard reports on what American lawyers are doing during the emergency and how their English brethren are carrying on under war conditions.
Sir Wilfred A. Greene, Master of the Rolls of England, and
Dr. Arthur L. Goodhart, professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford
University, gave off-the-record talks on conditions there. Other
speakers were Jacob M. Lashly, president of the American Bar
Association; Solicitor General Francis Biddle; and Judge Edward
R. Finch, chairman of the conference. Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
chairman of the conference Executive Committee, presided.
In attendance at the luncheon were Attorney General Jackson; justices of the United States Supreme Court; senior judges
of the federal circuit court of appeals from several districts;
judges of the United States Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia; chief justices of state supreme courts; law school
deans, and others.
VACATION OF JUDGMENTS - EXTRINSIC AND
INTRINSIC FRAUD
The principle that there has to be an end to litigation and
that when a party has had his day in court the judgment thus
rendered shall be final was first enunciated in 1702 by the Lord
Keeper in the High Court of Chancery in the case of Tovey v.
Young, 2 Vern. 437, S. C., 24 Eng. Rep. R. 93 (1702).
In the vacating of judgments, fraud plays an important part.
Generally, fraud justifying equntable relief against enforcement
of the judgment must be extrinsic to the issues. Con't. Nat'l
Bank v. Holland Bank Co., 66 F. (2d) 823 (C.C.A. Mo. 1933). The
leading case of United States v. Throckmorten, 98 U. S. 61, 25
L. ed. 93 (1878), held that fraudulent acts which will move a court
of equity to set aside or annul a judgment or decree relate to
frauds which are extrinsic to matters tried by the first court.
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This decision was based on the same principle as that of Tovey v.
Young in 1702. This relates only to cases between the same
parties, to the same subject of controversy, and rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction. In general, that is, the courts
will not again in such cases go into the merits of an action for
the purpose of detecting and annuling the fraud. United States
v. Throckmorten, supra.
We have stated that fraud to authorize a court's vacation of
a former judgment must in the great majority of cases be extrinsic. State v. Wright, 56 S. W. (2d) 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
Extrinsic fraud is some act or conduct of the prevailing party
which has prevented a fair submission of the controversy and includes such acts as: keeping party from exhibiting his case fully,
keeping party away from court, false promise of a compromise,
no knowledge on part of defendant of the suit, where an attorney
connives to defeat his client, and in all cases where there was not
a real contest. Putnam v. Putnam, 126 Kan. 479, 268 Pac. 797
(1928). Extrinsic fraud is that which is practiced directly upon
the party seeking relief against the judgment, which party has
been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court so that
but for such fraud the decision would be different. United States
v. Throckmorten, supra. Failure to give legal notice to adversary
has been held to be extrinsic fraud, also to prevent a witness from
attending a trial. Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 67 Pac. 282
(1902). The fraud of a party who occupied the dual capacity of
executrix and mother, in pushing the claim of her son by her
first marriage to heirship and distribution, was held to be extrinsic fraud in concealing the truth from the legal minor heirs, due
to the fact that they were not properly represented at the trial.
Sohler v. Sohler,, supra. Where the party who speaks falsely or
who refuses to sepak occupies a fiduciary relationship, the better
rule is that such fraud is extrinsic and will justify equitable interference. Latham v. McClenny, 36 Ariz. 337, 285 Pac. 684
(1930). The holding is an example where the fraud is generally
considered intrinsic, but the court places a constructive trust on
the property or the proceeds for the rightful owners. This is
done where it would not be conscionable to let the wrongdoers retain the benefits of their wrongs. Still another example would
be the, case where perjured testimony is employed, usually considered intrinsic fraud, and held to be extrinsic fraud, because the
jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon by the use of
such perjured testimony. Carey v. Carey, 121 Pa. Super. 251,
183 Atl. 371 (1936).
Intrinsic fraud is something that occurs in the course of an
adversary proceeding, such as the production of forged documents,
where adversary party has the opportunity to make the truth appear. Kasparian v. Kasparian, 132 Cal. App. 773, 23 P. (2d) 802
(1933).
Intrinsic fraud includes such matters as: fraudulent
testimony, perjured testimony, or any such matter which was
actually presented to and tried by the court in rendering the
judgment assailed. Intrinsic fraud as such will not be sufficient
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grounds for setting aside the judgment by the holding of a majority of the courst today. Intrinsic fraud is usually that fraud by
which a decree or judgment is obtained by false evidence upon
issues within the case. Sohler v. Soliler, supra.
A decree distributing deceased wife's estate could not be set aside merely because the husband falsely represented that the land was community property, the fraud being intrinsic, that is, perjured testimony. Meeker v. Waddle, 83 Wash. 628, 145 Pac. 967 (1915). A
false allegation by an administrator that he and his sister are sole
heirs of the decedent, whereby a decree of distribution is procured
does not entitle heirs to relief in equity, the fraud being intrinsic.
But this same administrator's sending remittances to a third person according to an annual custom of the deceased, so as to mislead the other heirs into believing that the deceased was still living, constituted extrinsic fraud so as to justify equitable relief,
the court held. Monk v. Morgan, 49 Cal. App. 154, 192 Pac. 1042
(1920. Where title to land was obtained by intrinsic fraud in
contravention of the terms of the will, the court placed a constructive trust on the land in favor of the rightful holders under the
will, recognizing as a matter of law the finality of the first decree as a muniment of title in the wrongdoers. In this case the
fraud was of an intrinsic nature but the court imposed an involuntary trust. Weyant v. Utah Savings Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 Pac.
189, 9 A.L.R. 1119 (1919). The last mentioned remedy given by
the court is often used when the strict holding of extrinsic fraud
would create too great an injustice. The failure of an administrator to give notice to a creditor of an estate of final settlement,
according to an agreement between administrator and creditor,
is not extrinsic fraud justifying equitable interference. Weyant
v. Utah Savings Co., supra.
In summary the following may be said of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in the vacating of judgments: most of the cases involve the setting aside of a judgment of a probate court, in which
it is required that the fraud must be of an .extrinsic nature, to
vitiate the decree; but the courts do make. exceptions where the
facts and merits of the case so demand. The questiton of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud arises largely in cases of contracts,
sales, divorce actions, wills, etc. Regardless of the subject of the
action, the rules stated apply to all of the cases. There is not one
definition of extrinsic fraud for wills and another for sales; the
distinctions and differences remain the same. The fraud must
be extrinsic to vacate the judgment, that is the strict and generally followed construction. However, courts will often decide
cases on their respective merits, as to the equitable rights of
parties involved, and impose a constructive trust, or employ a
special construction upon the particular fraud in the given
instance, so as to do equity and justice, but still lend lip-service
to the distinctions normally articulated.
ARLEY R. BJELLA,
Third Year Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
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THE LEGALITY OF CONCURRENT GENERAL AND
SPECIAL ELECTIONS
The system of elections in the United States is not of common-law origin, but is entirely statutory, and the exercise of the
right of suffrage is regulated in all states by constitutional and
statutory provisions.' Thus the problem as to whether or not
special and general elections may legally be held on the same day
and at the same place is one primarily of statutory determination
in the United States.
What are the distinguishing features of the two types of
elections? A general election is said to be one which occurs at
stated intervals, as fixed by law, and which occurs at stated intervals without any superinducing cause other than the efflux of
time; a special election is one that arises from some exigency
or special need outside of the usual routine, such as to submit to
the electors a measure or proposition for adoption or rejection.'
Coming back to the problem as to whether or not special and
general elections may be held at the same time and place, American Jurisprudence states, "Although under some constitutional
and statutory provisions it is held that a general and special election may be held upon the same day and at the same place, it has
been said that the weight of authority favors the definition that
a special election is one which takes place at a different time from
that at which an election fixed by law is held, and that the submission of special propositions at such an election does not
convert it into a special election."' From this quoted matter it
is indicated that special and general elections, by some rulings,
may be held on the same day and at the same place. As to the
latter part of the quotation, "that such an election does not convert it into a special election" there is considerable doubt. The
court in Dysart v. St. Louis' substantiates this by saying, "It is
a matter of common knowledge that at nearly every general election, propositions are authorized and submitted to the voters as
special propositions. Submission of these propositions are not,
in common parlance, called special elections. They are merely
votes on special propositions submitted at a general election."
But many, and it would seem the majority, of the cases hold
contra and adhere to the view that special propositions presented
at general elections are nevertheless special elections. In Furste
v. Gray' the Kentucky court follows this line of reasoning by
holding that the time for holding an election to fill a vacancy in
the General Assembly may be fixed for the same day as the general election, and this does not prevent it from being a "special
election."
118 Am. Jur., Elections, § 2.
'Supra, § 5.
'Ibid.
'321 Mo. 514, 11 S. W. (2d) 1045, 62 A.L.R. 762 (1928).

'240 Ky. 604, 42 S. W. (2d) 889 (1931).
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It has been held, also, that the submission of a proposed
amendment to a city charter constituted a "special election," although it was not so designated by the city council, and although
it was submitted at the same time as the general election.' This
is a next-door-neighbor case from Minnesota, where the ballots
containing the sole question as to whether this single amendment
should be adopted were submitted to the voters on general election day. The court had no difficulty in construing the acceptance of the amendment as being a special election. In view of
Chapter 238, Laws of Minnesota, 1903, it is obviously the intention of the Legislature,. according to the court, that, when an
amendment to the city charter is submitted at the same time as
a general election such as that held in the instant case in 1932,
the voting on the-amendment shall be considered a special election. The statute refers to "both elections," and it cannot be
otherwise construed.
A proposition as to issuance of bonds by the South Park Commissioners of Illinois, a municipal corporation empowered to maintain, improve, and develop parks and boulevards, was voted on at
the same time as the general city, county, and state election. The
court held that this did not change the character of the bond
issue election, and it was nevertheless a "special election."'
In Norton v. Coos County' one finds another case relating to
issuance of bonds. The only election authorized within the scope
and title of the Oregon Laws of 1913' related to special elections
to determine issuance of bonds and warrants. A road bond election, though held on the same day as a general election, was
nevertheless a "special election" within the meaning of section
11 of the said Act, providing that "only one special election shall
be held in one county in any one year." Therefore, a subsequent
road bond election during the same year was unauthorized and
void.
So, too, holds Wilson v. Wasco County," another Oregon case,
'in deciding that a road bond election is a special election in character, although held on the same day as the general election. Still
another Oregon case" sanctions this principle, holding that where
an initiative measure to move the county seat was voted on at the
general election, it was as to the initiative measure a "special
election." In People v. Czarnecki' it was held that an election to
fill a vacancy in the office of a state senator was a "special election," although held on the same day as a general election.

6Godward v. City of Minneapolis, 190 Minn. 51, 250 N. W. 719 (1933).
'George G. Renneker Co. v. South Park Com'rs, 322 I1. 393, 163 N. E. 786,
788 (1928).
1113 Ore. 619, 233 Pac. 664, 866 (1925).
'Ore. Laws 1913, c. 103, p. 170.
"*83 Ore. 147, 163 Pac. 317 (1917).
"Hill v. Hartzell, 121 Ore. 4, 252 Pac. 552, 555 (1927).
"312 Ill. 271, 143 N. E. 840, 841 (1924).
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Kentucky," Washington," and Montana' express approbation
of the principle under discussion.
It is seen, then, that there is authority for these two propositions: (1) general and special elections may be held on the same
day; (2) an election is nevertheless "special" although held at the
same time as a general election.
What is the North Dakota law? A case decided in 1909"
indicates that in a strict, legal sense, although the vote on a
change in county boundaries is cast at a general election, this is
the holding of a "separate election,'' notwithstanding that it was
held in connection with the general election for convenience, to
save expense, trouble, and time, which would be wasted in holding a special election, and because there is a better attendance of
voters at general elections than at most special elections, and thus
likely to be a more complete expression of the preference of the
electors. This case cites State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell," decided a year previously, wherein the court held that electors
might express their final choice for a United States senator at
the general election; this as a matter of convenience, and to save
expense. Such choice was voted at the same time and place, and
conducted by the same officers, as at the general election.
Notice might also be had of the law in North Dakota dealing with issuance of bonds for municipal corporations wherein
Section 10, Chapter 196 of the 1927 Laws of North Dakota, reads
as follows: "The ballot for such an election shall be separate from
other ballots on the same day for other elections. . . ." May one
not fairly presume from this statement alone that a special and
general election may be held on the same day and at the same
place in North Dakota?
But of course a condition precedent to the validity of dual
elections is that they be properly noticed as required by law. In
Corpus Juris it is stated: "Statutes giving directions as to the
mode and manner of conducting elections will be construed by the
courts as directory unless a noncompliance with their terms is expressly declared to be fatal, or will change or render doubtful the
result. If the statute simply provides that certain acts or things
shall be done at a particular time or in a particular manner with"Houston v. Boltz, 169 Ky. 640, 185 S. W. 76, 77 (1916):oAn election for the
issuance of bonds for the construction of public roads was none the less a
"special election" although held on the same day as the general November
election.
4State v. Superior Court for King County, 71 Wash. 484, 128 Pac. 1054,
1055, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 591 (1913): An election to fill the vacancy on a district
bench is a special election, though held on the same day of the general election.
.State v. Kehoe, 49 Mont. 582, 144 Pac. 162, 165 (1914); An election to fill
a vacancy although held at the same time as the general election, is a "special
election."
"State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N. D. 31, 119 N. W. 360 (1909).
""Separate" is no doubt used in the sense of "special," as this word is so
used later in the opinion of the case.
"818 N. D. 55, 118 N. W. 141 (1908).
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out declaring their performance is essential to the validity of the
election, they will be regarded as mandatory if they effect the
actual merits of the election, and directory if they do not. Where
the terms of the statute are absolute, explicit, and peremptory no
discretion is given; and when penalties are imposed against the
violation of its respective terms they have the same effect as
negative words and render its observance imperative ... ""
In Marsden v. Harlocker" it is said that in all general elections,
the time, place and manner of holding which are prescribed by
law, the rule is well-settled that electors must take notice thereof,
and as a corollary to this legal principle any requirements for the
issuing of proclamations or the giving of other notice in respect
to such elections must be treated as directory only. In the case
of special elections, however, all the statutory requirements as
to proclamations or other means of giving notice are considered
as mandatory and must be observed in order to render the vote
of the electors participating therein valid.
The reasons for this rule are obvious. Suffrage is a civil
right to which qualified persons are entitled. If the election,
being general, occurs at regular intervals, by operation of law,
these persons are presumed to have knowledge thereof. But
where some local project is under consideration, the propositions
are special, and qualified voters cannot be presumed to have
knowledge thereof, unless the statutory requirements are complied with.
Undoubtedly the rule in North Dakota is that elections must
be properly noticed so as to comply with the law, and this may be
seen in Perry v. Hackney,' wherein it is said that the conduct of
elections is mandatory.
Thus, in concluding, and in view of the apparent trend of authority in North Dakota, and in view of Chapter 196, Section 10
of the 1927 Laws of North Dakota, a special proposition may be
voted on legally in North Dakota at the same time as the general
election, if there is proper noticing, conducting of election, and
balloting.
MARGARET PFEFFER,
Second Year Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
"20 C. J., Elections, 1 223.
2048 Ore. 90, 85 Pac. 328, 120 Am. St. Rep. 786 (1908).

-11 N. D. 148, 90 N. W. 483 (1902).
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A WORD TO NEW LAWYERS
Once more the portals of the temple of Law have opened
to admit new disciples to the profession.
In this materialistic age it is not disinterested ideals, but
the acquisitive instinct that is the mainspring of ambition.
Success is measured by the size of accumulations, the incentive might be ambition for power, and in recent days this has
assumed additional importance. But the practice of our profession is not just commercial: but has been defined, - "as a
calling in life based on specific training and ability, contemplating public service and differentiating from ordinary
business vocation by its subordination of pecuniary returns to
efficient service."
May you receive inspiration from the foreword of the
report of the Committee on the Canon of Ethics of the American Bar Association, - "These Canons and the spirit they
breathe serve to convey a message of hope to every lawyer to
whom his profession is something more than a resource for
making a livelihood and who aspires in the practice of it to
play at least a humble role in a great organized movement to
promote human welfare and happiness through some approximation to an ideal administration of justice. Like the old
Grand Jury oath that inspired the utterance of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, in these Canons 'the word has been proclaimed, to
steady us when we weaken, to tell us that with all the failings
and backslidings, with all the fears and all the prejudices,
the spirit is still pure'."
May it be your happy lot to win a professional success that
the world will approve by the yardstick of its own standards,
but I counsel you never to abandon the higher ideals of your
profession.
The opportunities we enjoy here in this country should
serve to remind you that beyond the "work for work's sake,"
to dedicate your efforts also to the social ends to justify life
by higher standards. It is a base thing "to receive favors
and render none."
(Continued on next page)

